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A sawing job that would be just ridiculously hard and lengthy using a hand 
saw would be accomplished with a power saw. Likewise, certain cuts and 
materials would cause the smaller power saws to overheat or seize up 
altogether and therefore called for larger power saws. But even with the 
biggest power saw in the shop, Bobby Shaftoe always got the sense that he 
was imposing some kind of stress on the machine. It would slow down when 
the blade contacted the material, it would vibrate, it would heat up, and if you 
pushed the material through too fast it would threaten to jam. But then one 
summer he worked in a mill where they had a bandsaw. The bandsaw, its 
supply of blades, its spare parts, maintenance supplies, special tools and 
manuals occupied a whole room. It was the only tool he had ever seen with 
infrastructure. — Stephenson 2000, 270 (emphasis in original) 
 
Bobby Shaftoe, one of the protagonists of Neal Stephenson’s sprawling epic Cryptonomicon, 
learns that some tools have infrastructure: the systems necessary for their successful 
operation far exceed what any one individual could hope to control. But the potential of 
such tools also far outstrips individual effort: “the most noteworthy thing about the bandsaw 
was that you could cut anything with it and not only did it do the job quickly and coolly but 
it didn’t seem to notice that it was doing anything. It wasn’t even aware that a human being 
was sliding a great big chunk of stuff through it” (270).  
 
Joseph C. Pitt, in his new book Heraclitus Redux, makes a related observation about the tools 
necessary for modern science: it “relies on this technological infrastructure, in which large 
components involve work in which engineers play a major role” (38). The technological 
infrastructure is “an historically determined set of mutually supporting artifacts and 
structures that enable human activity and provide the means for its development” (36). In 
other words, it encompasses not just heavy engineering, but also “the range of things that 
make science possible: funding agencies, universities, private corporations, technicians, labs, 
graduate students, journals, and so on” (34). (Hence the National Science Foundation, for 
example, is in Pitt’s terms, a social technology (4).) Unless these components are in place and 
suitably coordinated, then modern scientific research cannot get off the ground. This is a 
crucial observation for any philosophy of science that hopes to engage with contemporary 
scientific practice. Although this is not a novel perspective, it is useful to have a self-
contained, concise and trenchantly argued volume to make the case for it. 
 
One ostensibly paradoxical consequence of Pitt’s perspective is that “engineering research is 
more fundamental than scientific research” (33). This thesis has wide-ranging implications 
for the philosophy of science. Pitt argues that “we have the sciences we do because they are 
embedded in certain technological infrastructures that facilitate certain ways of doing things 
and discourage others” (15). As a result, “basic notions we associate with science like 
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‘evidence,’ ‘observation,’ and ‘explanation’ also change over time and are science specific” 
(4). It is this emphasis on change, not just at the first-order level of ongoing scientific 
research and its output, but also of the means of understanding such research and its 
implications, that underpins Pitt’s choice of title. His vision of science is “Heraclitian” since 
“what we call ‘science’ is a set of multifaceted social processes in a constant state of change” 
(1). Indeed, philosophy itself is for Pitt also a technological infrastructure, since “it provides 
the techniques and criteria for critical inquiry regarding our place in the world” (101).  
 
Embracing the Problematic  
 
Pitt rejects the Kuhnian account of scientific change as insufficiently Heraclitian in 
suggesting the survival of some more or less unchanged criteria throughout the lifespan of a 
given paradigm. Kuhn’s broader influence has led to increased philosophical focus on case 
studies, but Pitt also cautions that “we don’t really know what constitutes a case study” (8). 
Echoing an earlier article, he argues that case studies do no real philosophical work: even if 
they are not cherrypicked to support the author’s thesis, they are insufficient to support an 
inductive generalization (Pitt 2001). (For one rejoinder, see Rittberg and Van Kerkhove 
2019.) Instead of either the paradigm or the case study, he advocates the “problematic”: “an 
issue or a set of related issues that have attracted the attention of a number of thinkers over 
a period of time” (9). The problematic avoids the rigidity of the paradigm and the inanity of 
the case study, if at the expense of requiring heroic amounts of historical contextualization. 
 
Pitt pursues the implications of his Heraclitian account beyond philosophy of science into 
“the incredible complexity of our contemporary society and how viewing it in terms of 
technological infrastructures helps to expose that complexity” (91). He works through some 
of the consequences of the U.S. federal government shutdown of 2018-19 as an illustration 
of “the extent to which we are captives of our technological infrastructures” (105). Events in 
2020 have provided us all with a similar example of vastly greater scale: few people would 
now dispute that “This shutdown is an excellent example of the interrelatedness of things. It 
also shows, in the modern world, how complicated it all is and how tied up with our 
technologies we are” (96). Shutdowns also demonstrate that Luddism can be no solution to 
the social problems posed by the ubiquity of technological infrastructures: “If we were to 
live our lives acting only on that about which we could be absolutely certain, we wouldn’t 
live our lives” (60).  
 
Instead, Pitt offers some directions in which a solution might be pursued. One answer would 
be to turn the problem against itself, by developing a technological infrastructure to cope 
with the complex problems posed by our dependence on technological infrastructures: “one 
way to anticipate unintended consequences is to model it using the increasingly powerful 
computers we are building” (103). A more fundamental response is educational. We cannot 
hope to respond adequately to the challenges posed by technological infrastructures if we do 
not understand how they work: “the more complicated the science and the more simplified 
the public explanations, the more readily we tend to accept those fantasies” (50). Hence our 
dependency on technological infrastructure makes public understanding of science, and the 
philosophy of science, all the more urgent. 
 
Indeed, one of the principal strengths of the book is pedagogic. In particular, Pitt makes 
effective use of examples drawn from contemporary science. Hence we learn not only of 
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Galileo’s use of the telescope (Chapter 3) and of scanning tunneling electron microscopes 
(Chapter 5) but also of the spherical aberration in the main mirror of the Hubble telescope 
and the complicated systemic failings that led to its being launched with this defect (Chapter 
6) and of KATRIN, the Karlsruhe Tritium Neutrino experiment, an exemplary piece of 
twenty-first century Big Science (Chapter 7). Pitt works through these examples with care, 
thereby reinforcing not only familiar concerns about the theoreticity of observation, but also 
his deeper point that the theories at issue continue to change in profound ways. His 
discussion of the role of artificial intelligence in science demonstrates this point effectively 
(Chapter 9). What are we to make of research in the biosciences in which “a computer 
program designed the experiment. The scientist in charge does not know what the 
experiment is supposed to do” (86)? Or the use of machine learning techniques, such as 
generative adversarial networks, to improve the output from scientific instruments? Unlike 
more conventional computer software, these methods are effectively black boxes, their inner 
workings in principal inscrutable to the scientists who develop them—let alone the scientists 
who employ them in other fields. All of these examples are thought provoking and 
calculated to catch the imagination of philosophy of science students—and their instructors. 
 
There are a few regrettable errors, some trivial, some more consequential. The “immortal 
words ... ‘Follow the money’” (104) are of course from All the President’s Men (1976) not The 
Graduate (1967). It was not Georg Joachim Rheticus who “wrote a preface [to Copernicus’s 
De Revolutionibus] in which he described the theory as a purely mathematical account” (30), 
but Andreas Osiander, much to Rheticus’s disgust. Indeed, Rheticus is known to have 
defaced multiple copies of De Revolutionibus by striking out Osiander’s preface (Danielson 
2006, 112). And, in the context of a discussion of carbon emissions, it seems doubly 
confused to refer to “bright spots such as ... the decision by France to phase out its nuclear 
plants” (104). Firstly, France has made no such decision, although there have been some 
inconsistent moves to reduce France’s uniquely high level of nuclear power generation; Pitt 
perhaps intended to refer to Germany, which made such a decision in 2011. But, more 
importantly, from the perspective of climate change remediation, the German nuclear phase-
out has been a disaster: it is estimated to have led to an increase in “CO2 emissions of 36.3 
Mt per year” (not to mention “more than 1,100 additional deaths per year” from increased 
air pollution) (Jarvis et al. 2019, 25). Since nuclear power has never produced as much as a 
quarter of German electricity but consistently produces more than two thirds of French 
electricity, a similar phase-out in France would be even more catastrophic for climate and 
public health. 
 
Broader Applications  
 
Pitt’s book should be of value to a broad range of philosophers of science. As a case in 
point, my own specialism is the philosophy of mathematics, which Pitt does not address 
directly. Yet his work holds much interest for the philosopher of mathematics—indeed he 
echoes several recent developments (and philosophers of mathematics have made use of his 
earlier work: e.g. Rittberg and Van Kerkhove 2019). Technological infrastructure in 
mathematics can be understood in several distinct ways and Pitt’s work holds potential for 
all of them.  
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Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, computers have in recent decades come to be used in 
more and more fundamental ways by mathematicians. The rise of “computer assisted” 
proofs in turn gave rise to a philosophical debate over the legitimacy of such results which 
directly parallels debates in (philosophy of) the empirical sciences over the legitimacy of 
computer assisted observations (MacKenzie 2001).  
 
Secondly, progress in mathematics itself can be understood in terms of the development of 
purely mathematical tools of ever greater complexity (Marquis 1997). Mathematical tools, 
such as Galois theory or K-theory, provide relationships between mathematical objects of 
apparently quite different kinds. Once such a relationship has been rigorously established, it 
is possible to prove results about objects of one kind by studying the related, presumably 
more tractable, objects of the other kind. In recent decades, the scale and scope of such 
innovations has come to dwarf much of the previous history of mathematics (Zalamea 
2012).  
 
Lastly, but perhaps most directly in the spirit of Pitt’s work, some recent research into 
mathematical practice has drawn out the significance of social machines, combinations of 
people and computers understood as unified problem-solving entities (Martin and Pease 
2013; Shadbolt et al. 2019). The computers within mathematical social machines are 
generally not doing the mathematics (although that is a foreseeable development, at least for 
routine computation). Rather they facilitate the collaboration and interaction of human 
mathematicians by providing an appropriate infrastructure. In recent decades, this has 
helped to transform the way much mathematical research is conducted. In sum, attention to 
mathematical practice reveals multiple instances of increasingly indispensable and innovative 
infrastructure. Doubtless close attention to the recent practice of many other sciences would 
yield similar insights. Heraclitus Redux is a valuable roadmap for philosophers of science 
setting out to explore such developments. 
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